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On June 3, 2003, the European Council of health ministers rejected a proposal
from the European Commission to allow drug manufacturers to advertise
directly to particular groups of patients; the proposal had already been rejected
by the European Parliament subsequent to a heated public debate in which
consumer and patient groups almost unanimously argued that it was not the
role of drug companies to provide information to patients. The pilot scheme
suggested by the Commission would only have applied to patients with three
chronic diseases, AIDS, diabetes, and asthma, and would, it was argued, not
undermine an overall ban. Drug companies would have been required to abide
by a special code of conduct and clear any information given to patients—on
web sites or in specialized publications—with national authorities.
In parallel with these developments, the European Commissioner for Enter-
prise and Information Society Erkki Liikanen and Public Health Commissioner
David Byrne launched the so-called group of ten or “G10.” This was an
initiative that brought together representatives of patients, national govern-
ments, and the drug and health insurance industries to discuss ways of
increasing the competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry and
capitalizing on the industry’s potential for improving public health in the
European Union. One issue that was discussed was the possibility of lifting the
current ban on direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription-only medicines
(DTCA) in order to extend the information on healthcare available to patients.
In light of political developments, it was not surprising that in June 2004 the
G10 recommended that a clear distinction be made between patient informa-
tion and commercial marketing of pharmaceutical products, and that the ban
on DTCA should remain in force.
One of the G10 members who most explicitly supported this recommenda-
tion was Angela Coulter.1 Amid widespread enthusiasm for liberalization of
drug advertising among other health commentators, she argued convincingly
that it is inappropriate to delegate responsibility for informing patients to
commercial companies, that marketing typically is biased and untruthful, and
that a free market for information about medicines would fail to empower
patients to make independent decisions about their own care and treatment.
Coulter’s argument is largely representative of those opposed to lifting the
ban on DTCA and this article takes her position as a starting point. We point
out that the evidence on whether DTCA should be allowed in a regulated form
or banned is divided. From this preliminary conclusion we proceed to intro-
duce further issues into the debate, which point to the advantages of a much
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softer approach, entailing selective regulation, rather than a blanket ban on
advertising.
For and Against a Free Market in Information
A number of senior policymakers and health commentators have expressed
support for the idea of giving the pharmaceutical industry liberty to inform
patients directly about treatment options on offer.2 A typical line of argument in
favor of lifting the ban on DTCA is that in order to make informed choices for
themselves, patients require more information about the options for treatment
available, and that the most efficient way to achieve this is to let the producers
raise public awareness about their products.3 There is a perception that health-
care systems in general, and doctors in particular, have so far been insuffi-
ciently proactive in providing patients with information, and that many health
problems, for which treatment is available, go unrecognized in their early
phases. Other resources and new approaches will have to be brought into play
to promote disease awareness in the general public, especially in groups that
are underutilizing health services at present. It is also argued that because the
industry under the current ban has had to target their information efforts at
healthcare professionals (i.e., doctors), they have de facto contributed to the
widening of a perceived “knowledge gap” between suppliers and consumers of
healthcare services. A doctor’s monopoly on information and knowledge about
health and healthcare has contributed to an increase in patients’ dependency on
the medical profession and has reinforced paternalistic practices. Removing the
ban on DTCA would, arguably, help to rectify this imbalance.
Evidence from New Zealand and the United States, where DTCA is already
sanctioned, lends some support to these conclusions. Sumpradit et al.4 explored
how chronic patients’ interactions with doctors were affected by DTA and
found that a positive attitude toward advertising among patients was associ-
ated with their willingness to talk with doctors about the advertised drugs.
Crucially, those patients who eventually asked for a prescription tended to
agree that DTCA helped them make their own decisions about medical treat-
ment. Murray et al.5 found that DTCA strengthens patient–doctor relationships
because it encourages patients to disclose health concerns to their doctors and
enhances patients’ sense of control and self-efficacy during the consultation.
Doctors also find DTCA advantageous to the relationship, provided that they
find the information conveyed in advertisements relevant and adequate, and
that patients seek their opinion rather than demand a specific treatment. The
positive impact of DTCA on the patient–doctor relationship seems most signif-
icant in groups of lower socioeconomic status and doctors, which could make
a concern for equity an argument in favor of lifting the ban.6
Research also shows DTCA to be an effective way of targeting clinical
problems, which are generally underdiagnosed in the population. Thus, whereas
DTCA is generally market expanding in underdiagnosed therapeutic classes, it
seems to have little or no influence on the brand of medicine chosen (no
business-stealing effect); that supports the claim that marketing reaches pa-
tients who would otherwise lack information.7 Further study has shown,
moreover, that DTCA effectively increases the number of requests that patients
from lower socioeconomic groups, who are traditionally considered hard to
reach with public health campaigns, make for preventive treatment and sched-
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uled check-ups.8 DTCA may therefore be an efficient way of changing health
behavior and improving health utilization. At the same time there is a strong
incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to advertise. In the United States,
every $20 invested in DTCA generates one new prescription with an average
wholesale price that far exceeds that. There seems to be few losers if DTCA is
deregulated. The fact that advertising raises public awareness about treatment
in areas where better information is scarce, and at the same time increases the
industry’s profitability, has led some economists to go as far as to call DTCA “a
public good.” 9
Coulter rejects these arguments on the grounds that the health information
that can be made available to patients through commercial marketing is inade-
quate, biased, untruthful, and restricted mainly to blockbuster drugs. She argues
that regardless of the fact that there is a need for the public to become better
informed about medical treatment and health issues in general, it should not be
the responsibility of the drug industry to deliver this information. Commercial
companies will seek maximum profit and will tend to exaggerate the significance
of those health problems for which they offer a medical cure. Their marketing
efforts will encourage scared patients to demand medicine that is “not clinically
needed” and deceive them into believing that they suffer from serious conditions
that would otherwise not have caused them any concern.10 This will introduce a
new relationship of dependency where patients are reliant on the producers of
medicines, and it will distort priorities because patients will pressure doctors to
prescribe drugs that have been promoted by the industry.
She also finds that the information that is offered by the industry is of a sub-
standard quality and gives patients an unrealistic impression of what they can
expect from their treatment. Rather than giving patients access to comprehen-
sive, unbiased information on the pros and cons of a given treatment, advertising
is inherently partial, single-sided, and unambiguously positive toward one prod-
uct or brand. It is, after all, not in a company’s interest to inform consumers that
a competitor has a superior product—even if this indeed is the case. Due to this
lack of information, patients will supposedly lose out.
Coulter acknowledges that paternalism remains a significant problem in
healthcare delivery, and that the lack of information available to patients is
seriously counteracting any improvement in medical practice on this point. She
argues, however, that allowing DTCA would not have the effect opponents of
the ban hope for, because it would not address the substance of the problem.
Information from drug companies would, allegedly, be seen as “poor quality
information” by both patients and doctors and would do nothing to help
identify the patient’s true preferences and options within the clinical consul-
tation. Doctors would know that advertisers are attempting to manipulate
patients into requesting their products and that could work against patients.
Instead of allowing DTCA of prescription medicines, Coulter suggests a
partnership involving the government, patients, government agencies, and the
industry. Such a joint effort would, she argues, be the only way to ensure that
consumers get balanced information of high quality about the effects and
adverse effects of medicines. Drawing together a wider range of resources, the
partners would be able to inform the public as well as patients about health
and healthcare, based on the best available evidence and current practice.
Coulter’s claims are also supported by evidence. In New Zealand 40% of
spending on DTCA is used to promote 10 medicines, which are all new,
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expensive patented drugs for long-term treatment of conditions such as allergy,
ulcer, anxiety, obesity, impotence, and high blood cholesterol.11 This finding is
explained in other research that shows that pharmaceutical companies are
much less likely to actively promote a drug to consumers if their competitors
offer the same or a very similar product, and that “first move advertisers” are
likely to spend more money on DTCA than those competitors who start to
advertise later.12 The effect is that DTCA will naturally be concentrated on a
few branded blockbuster drugs. More worryingly perhaps, studies in the
United States have shown that drug advertisements tend to play on consumers’
anxieties and fears of serious illness, promote the impression that medicine is
the only solution to health problems,13 and give confusing or incorrect infor-
mation about risk factors, disease prevalence14 and side-effects.15 Prescribing
doctors experience the public’s anxieties as a direct pressure, and evidence
confirms that physicians feel compelled to prescribe medicines that have been
actively promoted in the media. In a telephone poll carried out among pre-
scribing doctors in Ohio, 91% of respondents reported that they did feel
pressured by requests from patients and that in 36% of such cases doctors gave
in to patients and prescribed a drug that would not have been their first choice
of treatment.16 Other studies have shown DTCA to have an adverse effect on
doctors’ perceptions of time efficiency and the number of appropriate tests and
treatments carried out,17 and that doctors are more likely to feel their authority
and clinical judgment challenged if patients refer to information from adver-
tisements. That perception is potentially harmful (even if it is mistaken) to the
relationship between patients and doctors because it undermines the recipro-
cated trust that is so essential to a successful interaction between them.18
Health insurers in the United States have, moreover, long been concerned about
the cost implications of increasing demand and a shift in prescription patterns
toward expensive preventive drug treatments aimed at broad segments of the
population. DTCA is believed to be at least part of the reason for historic hikes
in U.S. pharmaceutical spending in the last decade.19
Free Markets and Prescription Medicines
Based on the literature review above, the evidence on DTCA appears inconclu-
sive, and seems to provide support to both those proposing and opposing
deregulation of the advertising market for new medicines. The policy decision
cannot be made on evidence alone. One key premise that seems to underpin
the call for the abolition of the ban is the understanding that free competition
in an unregulated market is, prima facie, the most efficient way for consumers to
get information about drug options and to eventually satisfy their preferences
for medical treatment. Those opposed to lifting the ban on DTCA may want to
dismiss the viability of this premise by rejecting the overall advantages of
advertising and free competition—but then the argument against DTCA would
inevitably have consequences far beyond the market in prescription medicines.
It would infer a rejection of a market economy as such, and that is probably not
what Coulter and others in favor of a ban on DTCA want to advocate. Instead
they may well accept the premise in principle but argue that, although it is
relevant in other sectors of the economy, the principle does not apply to the
market for prescription drugs. Accepting the premise that there is an advantage
to having free unregulated markets does, of course, not necessarily imply a
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rejection of any kind of market regulation. The workings of the particular
market may indeed be such that a ban is justified. The onus is clearly on those
who want a ban, however, to provide convincing justification for such a policy.
The market for medical treatment is different from most other markets in the
economy, because it is characterized by deep asymmetries in information. In
the market for medical treatment it is often the case that the supplier of
healthcare has much better information about what the buyer needs than the
buyer has. This means that it is easy for suppliers to induce demand for their
services, and that some of the usual assumptions about informational symme-
try in free markets cannot be upheld in the medical market.20 We may argue
that regulation of the market intended to minimize supplier-induced demand
can therefore be justified. It is, however, important to note that the supplier best
placed to induce demand in the medical market is the healthcare professional
who is in direct contact with the patient, and that informational asymmetries
between suppliers and consumer of drugs are usually considerably smaller.
A Ban on Free Information
Can the asymmetries in the market for healthcare information provide sufficient
grounds for regulation in the form of an outright ban on DTCA of prescription
drugs? Coulter’s reasons for supporting such a ban can be summarized as fol-
lows: DTCAis inherently poor quality information; DTCAundermines the patient–
doctor relationship and increases patients’ dependency on drug producers; DTCA
distorts clinical priorities and increases the demand for and cost of healthcare.
But are these reasons strong enough to justify a complete ban?
It is not surprising that drug advertising is single-sided and biased in favor
of a particular product (after all, advertisement usually is). There are at least
three groups of patients, however, who may prefer the simple and easily
accessible information offered in advertisements to the more comprehensive,
balanced, and technical information entailed in Coulter’s partnership approach.
First, there is a significant group of patients of low socioeconomic status, whom
it is notoriously difficult to reach with traditional health information. Because
DTCA has proved to be a more effective way of informing this group, it seems
fair to argue that although the information conveyed in advertising is not
completely exhaustive, it is still better than no information. Banning advertis-
ing may in some cases leave these patients worse off. For example, if I am not
aware that modern and reasonably effective drugs against urge incontinence
are available, I may unnecessarily continue to live with my incontinence and
my incontinence pads. Second, there is a group of patients suffering from
minor or temporary health problems who, although capable of accessing more
complex information, still prefer the easily available information from adver-
tising. They may find that their time is better spent on other things, and that
DTCA gives them sufficient information to ask for a relevant drug when
visiting their doctor. An example of a patient from this group would be the
busy professional who can recognize the first symptoms of an ulcer from a
drug advertisement and can therefore request an appropriate drug from her
doctor. Even in the cases where the advertised drug is not entirely appropriate,
advertisement will at least have initiated an exchange of information between
patient and doctor. Third, there is a group of patients who have extensive
experience with managing chronic, long-term conditions or recurring illness.
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They may find that they already have all the information they require to make
informed decisions and that they should be allowed a free choice of a drug
with a branded image if they so wish. In the choice of asthma inhaler the
chronic sufferer may, for instance, emphasize ease of use or smart design or
compatibility with this season’s colors in choosing between inhalers with very
similar efficacy. It is difficult to see why people should be denied this infor-
mation, which is probably unlikely to figure prominently in government-
controlled health information. Increased demand from these groups, to which
most patients probably belong, will not be due to information asymmetry
between users and producers of drugs. In fact, denying them information from
advertisements will potentially harm some patients, because it exposes them to
exploitation by health professionals who can take advantage of the information
gap that persists between them and patients. This is not to say, of course, that
there are not patient groups who may be unduly influenced by commercial
advertising and should be protected from the adverse effects of DTCA. What it
does mean, however, is that there are clear adverse effects of an outright ban.
The argument that DTCA evidently increases demand for only a small
number of heavily promoted categories of drugs carries some merit, but it also
seems insufficient justification for prohibiting advertising. Although the argu-
ment points to the need for supplementary information being made available
alongside information from advertisements, it does nothing to disqualify the
quality of the information provided by DTCA. Increased demand may well be
due to patients’ improved ability to choose medicines in accordance with their
preferences, based on sufficient and appropriate information. If that is the case,
then “disease mongering” is maybe not such a bad thing after all. The fact that
members of the medical profession see a given problem as “an ordinary
ailment” for which treatment is “not clinically needed” 21 is essentially irrele-
vant if patients find the problem significant enough to seek treatment. It is
therefore not a problem that doctors are unhappy about patients demanding
specific treatments and feel the patient–doctor relationship undermined by
DTCA. Doctors should get into the habit of arguing their case if they think that
what the patient requests is clinically inappropriate. This would, over time,
strengthen rather than weaken the relationship. There will, of course, be some
drug categories that are not promoted in advertisements. Information on cheap
and established generic medicines, such as, for example, low dose aspirin, is
unlikely to be available through DTCA, and alternative ways to raise public
awareness about these treatments must be found. But this highlights a need for
healthcare information in addition to the information available through DTCA—
not the abolition of DTCA.
That advertising drives up the cost of healthcare provision is a distinct issue
that relates to problems of “moral hazard” in insurance systems. Copayment
schemes can be and are used to address this. It obviously does not follow
directly from allowing DTCA for certain drugs that a public healthcare system
should still fund prescriptions in the same way as in areas without DTCA. This
is a separate issue.
Why a Partial Ban?
The asymmetries in the market for prescription drugs may justify some degree
of intervention by government agencies. A balanced approach is nevertheless
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required. On the one hand, it cannot be left entirely to the drug industry to
inform patients about medicines because information will then only be avail-
able on some medicines and because some patients do not get the information
they need in order to make independent decisions from advertising. Alterna-
tive information resources should, therefore, we might argue, be made avail-
able to them. On the other hand, however, there are some groups of patients
who are effectively harmed as a direct result of a ban on DTCA, either because
they need information that is only available through advertising or because
they simply prefer the more easily accessible information offered in advertise-
ments. For this reason, a more selective approach to regulation of DTCA is
preferable to a blanket ban.
It is also important to note that the alternative to allowing DTCA is not the
provision of unbiased and truthful information. Implying or stating a dichot-
omous choice between DTCA or unbiased and truthful information is simply a
false dichotomy. As noted above, there is a general lack of health information
and a general lack of penetration of the available information to disadvantaged
groups. We may hope that governments will take their responsibility for pro-
viding health information more seriously in the future, but it is difficult to see
a direct link between this and the DTCA issue. It is also obvious that whereas
at least one pharmaceutical firm has an interest in promoting the most effective
treatment, a public healthcare system only has an interest in promoting the
most cost-effective treatment (which may or may not be the most effective). We
can therefore not assume that continuing a blanket ban on DTCA will auto-
matically lead to the adequate provision of unbiased and truthful information.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that, on balance, it is difficult to see why DTCA
should be banned outright. It seems fair to argue that a regulated market for
healthcare information provided by suppliers to consumers should be allowed
in areas such as (1) chronic disease, in which patients usually develop expertise
in understanding and managing their own condition (asthma, diabetes, etc.);
(2) minor or short-lived health problems that do not require patients to have
extensive information to make decisions about treatment efficiently (early
symptoms of ulcer, etc.); (3) undertreated patient groups in which initial
self-diagnosis is sufficiently reliable and not too worrying (incontinence, hair
loss, etc.); and (4) prescription areas with a large life-style component (impo-
tence, mood enhancement, etc.). We do not claim that this list is exhaustive, and
each item on the list also needs further elaboration. We do, however, claim that
for the disease categories and treatment modalities on our list the burden of
proof falls strongly on those who want a ban on DTCA to remain in place. A
system that allows for DTCA in some areas of the market for prescription
medicines yields clear rewards, and the European Commission should strive to
pass legislation that gives patients the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of free
healthcare information, while at the same time protects those patients who are
particularly vulnerable against its disadvantages.
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